University of Wyoming College of Law

Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship
Faculty Articles

UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship

1-29-2010

Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of Adjudication
Stephen Matthew Feldman
University of Wyoming College of Law, sfeldman@uwyo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles

Recommended Citation
Feldman, Stephen Matthew, "Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of Adjudication" (2010).
Faculty Articles. 92.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles/92

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship at Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of Adjudication
Abstract:
When John Roberts and Samuel Alito testified during their Senate confirmation hearings, they
promised to decide cases apolitically in accord with the rule of law. Yet, during their first terms
on the Supreme Court, they repeatedly voted to decide cases consistently with their conservative
political ideologies. One must wonder: did Roberts and Alito lie? This Essay answers this
crucial question by critiquing the theories of Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin, two of the
most prominent jurisprudents of this era. While Posner and Dworkin have vehemently attacked
each other, they both maintain that Supreme Court adjudication of hard cases is politics writ
large: the justices self-consciously and expansively decide cases according to their political
ideologies. From this perspective, Roberts, Alito, and other Supreme Court nominees either
purposefully lie or are naively ignorant when they proclaim fidelity to an apolitical form of
adjudication. But, as this Essay argues, Posner and Dworkin share a common error. Although
they correctly recognize that Supreme Court adjudication is political, they mistakenly assume
that it therefore must be writ large. Instead, it is politics writ small. Legal interpretation is never
mechanical. The justices sincerely interpret and apply the law, but the justices’ political
ideologies necessarily shape their interpretations of the relevant legal texts. Thus, in the typical
case, the justices’ best interpretations of the law coincide with their respective political
ideologies. Supreme Court adjudication as politics writ small largely obviates the need for a
judicial politics writ large. One might, consequently, criticize Roberts’s and Alito’s
interpretations of legal texts, like the Constitution, without necessarily questioning their integrity.
Contents:
I. Posner, Dworkin, and Adjudication as Politics Writ Large
A. Posner and Pragmatic Adjudication
B. Dworkin and Principled Adjudication
C. Adjudication and Politics
II. Adjudication as Politics Writ Small
A. On Interpretation
B. The Institution of the Supreme Court in Relation to Legal Interpretation
C. The Implications of an Adjudicative Politics Writ Small for Dworkin and
Posner
D. When Political and Interpretive Judgments Diverge
E. A Source of Disagreement Between Posner and Dworkin
III. Conclusion: Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie?
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During their Senate confirmation hearings, John Roberts and Samuel Alito both vowed to
be modest and restrained Supreme Court justices. They would faithfully apply the Constitution
and doggedly follow the rule of law rather than actively imposing any particular political
ideology. In a widely reported proclamation, Roberts explained, “Judges are like umpires—
umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.”1 Yet, after the Roberts Court’s first two terms,
few observers doubt whether Roberts and Alito have turned the Court to the political right.
Numerous articles have appeared in mass-media periodicals juxtaposing, on the one hand,
Roberts’s and Alito’s declarations of apolitical fidelity to law and, on the other hand, their
sharply conservative votes in case after case.2 Among other conservative decisions, the Roberts
Court has upheld restrictions on abortion, limited employee rights to recover for pay
discrimination, and chided school districts for considering students’ races as a means to integrate
public schools.3
So, did Roberts and Alito lie during their confirmation hearings?4 Did they duplicitously
proclaim dedication to the rule of law while secretly planning to implement their political
______________________________
1
Robert Schwartz, Like They See ’Em, New York Times, Oct. 6, 2005, at A37.
2

David Von Drehle, The Incredible Shrinking Court, Time, Oct. 11, 2007
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1670489,00.html> (accessed Jan. 2, 2008);
Jeffrey Rosen, Courting Controversy, Time, June 28, 2007
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1638444,00.html> (accessed Jan. 2, 2008);
Simon Lazarus, More Polarizing than Rehnquist, American Prospect, May 2007, at 23.
3

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738
(2007) (proscribing reliance on race in assigning students to schools); Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007) (limiting employee remedies for pay
discrimination); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding restictions on partialbirth abortion).
4

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1069, 1070 (2006) (describing Roberts as being
“disingenuous”).

Supreme Court Nominees - 4 agendas? While I disagree with the justices’ votes in practically every controversial case,
Roberts and Alito most likely answered senators’ questions honestly. And the justices have
probably applied the rule of law in good faith during their initial terms. But how is this possible
when they repeatedly vote for the conservative judicial outcome? Most simply, law and politics
are not opposites. Roberts, Alito, and other justices do not necessarily disregard the law merely
because they vote to decide cases consistently with their respective political ideologies. As a
general matter, Supreme Court justices can decide legal disputes in accordance with law while
simultaneously following their political preferences.
I elaborate this thesis by critiquing the theories of Judge Richard Posner5 and Professor
Ronald Dworkin,6 two of the most prominent jurisprudents of this era. Embattled opponents,
Posner and Dworkin have for years relentlessly attacked each other while developing strikingly
different depictions of law and adjudication.7 Despite their opposition, Posner and Dworkin
together challenge a primary assumption of traditional jurisprudence—an assumption featured
during Roberts’s and Alito’s Senate confirmation hearings. Most senators, jurists, and legal
scholars assume that legal interpretation and judicial decision making can be separated from
politics. A judge or justice who decides according to political ideology skews or corrupts the
judicial process. 8 Posner and Dworkin reject this traditional approach, particularly for hard cases
______________________________
5
Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003) [hereinafter Posner, Law];
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (1999) [hereinafter Posner,
Theory]; Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31 (2005)
[hereinafter Posner, Foreword].
6

Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin, Robes]; Ronald
Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1996) [Dworkin, Freedom]; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Seriously].
7

Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718 (1998); Ronald
Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 353 (1997); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics
Of Moral And Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Against
Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
8

For descriptions and constructive criticisms of traditional doctrinal scholarship, see
Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and
External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & Soc. Inquiry 89, 96-98 (2005);

Supreme Court Nominees - 5 at the level of the Supreme Court. Each in his own way asserts and explains the power of
politics in adjudication: the justices self-consciously vote and thus decide cases according to
their political ideologies. Posner and Dworkin agree that the justices do not and should not
decide hard cases by applying an ostensibly clear rule of law in a mechanical fashion. The
justices must be political in an open and expansive manner.9 Supreme Court adjudication is, in
other words, politics writ large.
The conflicts between Posner and Dworkin stem from their distinct views of politics.
Posner views politics as a pluralist battle among self-interested individuals and groups. He
therefore argues that Supreme Court adjudication, manifesting politics writ large, should (and in
fact does) entail a pragmatic focus on consequences. The justices should resolve cases by
looking to the future and by aiming to do what is best in both the short- and long-terms.10
Dworkin, repudiating a pragmatic politics of self-interest, favors instead a politics of principles.
Thus, according to Dworkin, the justices should resolve hard cases by applying law as integrity.
They should theorize about the political-moral principles that fit the doctrinal history—including
case precedents and constitutional provisions—and that cast the history in its best moral light.11
Consequently, although Posner and Dworkin both describe the Supreme Court as a political
institution—as engaging in politics writ large—their theories otherwise clash tumultuously.
Posner sees an adjudicative politics of interest and unmitigated practicality, while Dworkin sees
an adjudicative politics of principles and coherent theory.
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 257-60 (2005). For
examples of such legal scholarship, see Johnny C. Parker, Equal Protection Minus Strict Scrutiny
Plus Benign Classification Equals What? Equality of Opportunity, 11 Pace L. Rev. 213 (1991);
Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional
Litigation, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 1317 (1997). For an optimistic assessment of legal scholarship,
arguing that an increasing number of legal scholars are drawing upon political science literature,
see Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature
Hits the Law Schools, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 511 (2007).
9

Dworkin, Robes, supra note 6, at 1-35; Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 41-42.

10

Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 13, 71.

11

Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 52-53, 90.

Supreme Court Nominees - 6 Unfortunately, both Posner and Dworkin—like Roberts, Alito, and the senators who
questioned them—remain stuck within the magnetic field of the traditional law-politics
dichotomy. While most jurists, legal scholars, and senators are pulled to the law pole—
maintaining that law mandates case results—Posner and Dworkin are pulled to the opposite pole.
If politics matters to adjudication, they seem to say, then politics must become the overriding
determinant of judicial outcomes. Supreme Court adjudication must be politics writ large. If
true, then Supreme Court nominees who declare their fidelity to the rule of law do, in fact, lie:
current and future justices decide cases by hewing to their political ideologies, not to legal
doctrines and precedents. But struggling against the forces of the law-politics dichotomy, Posner
and Dworkin overcompensate. They neglect another possibility: namely, that Supreme Court
adjudication is politics writ small. As Posner and Dworkin emphasize, the Court is a political
institution: the justices’ political ideologies always and inevitably influence their votes and
decisions. But usually the justices do not self-consciously attempt to impose their politics in an
expansive manner. To the contrary, the justices sincerely interpret and apply the law. Yet,
because legal interpretation is never mechanical, the justices’ political ideologies necessarily
shape how they understand the relevant legal texts, whether in constitutional or other cases.
Part I of this Essay elaborates Posner’s description of pragmatic adjudication and
Dworkin’s theory of principled adjudication.12 Part II explains why, contrary to Posner’s and
Dworkin’s positions, Supreme Court decision making is most often politics writ small. Because
of the integral role that politics plays in legal interpretation, a justice’s interpretive judgment will
in most instances coincide with her political ideology, including pragmatic concerns and political
morality. In the typical case, then, a justice would not self-consciously vote to promote her
political ideology. Doing so would be unnecessary (from a political standpoint); the justice
would only need to vote in accordance with her best interpretive judgment.13 Part II closes by
______________________________
12
See infra text accompanying notes _-_.
13

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

Supreme Court Nominees - 7 linking Posner’s and Dworkin’s disputes to their respective misunderstandings of the (legal)
interpretive process.14 Part III, the Conclusion, briefly explains the implications of an
adjudicative politics writ small for the controversy surrounding Roberts and Alito.15
I. Posner, Dworkin, and Adjudication as Politics Writ Large
A. Posner and Pragmatic Adjudication
Posner explicitly argues that Supreme Court adjudication, especially in constitutional
cases, is politics writ large.16 The justices self-consciously vote (and thus decide cases) in
accordance with their political ideologies. The Supreme Court, in this way, is unique, according
to Posner. Lower court judges, Posner writes, generally are “tethered to authoritative texts, such
as constitutional and statutory provisions, and to previous judicial decisions.”17 That is, lower
court judges follow the law, except in the unusual case “when the law is uncertain and emotions
aroused.”18 But at the Supreme Court, “the issues are more uncertain and more emotional and
the judging less constrained.”19 Because of the Supreme Court’s institutional position within our
constitutional system—at the apex of the judicial hierarchy—the Court is overtly, broadly, and
consistently political. “A constitutional court composed of unelected, life-tenured judges,
guided, in deciding issues at once emotional and politicized, only by a very old and in critical
______________________________
14
See infra text accompanying notes _-_.
15

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

16

Posner writes:

From a practical standpoint, constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court is … the
exercise of discretion—and that is about all it is. If … the Court is asked to decide
whether execution of murderers under the age of eighteen is constitutional, it is at large.
Nothing compels a yes or a no. [There are] no external constraints on the Justices’
decision.
Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 41-42 (emphasis added).
17

Id. at 40.

18

Id. at 48.

19

Id. at 49.

Supreme Court Nominees - 8 passages very vague constitution (yet one as difficult to amend as the U.S. Constitution is), is
potentially an immensely powerful political organ.”20 In fact, when deciding constitutional
issues, the Court “is political in the sense of having and exercising discretionary power as
capacious as a legislature’s.”21 Thus, Posner describes one recent case as “a naked political
judgment,” and explains that “the Justices exercise vast discretion, thrashing about in a trackless
wilderness.”22
Based on this conclusion—that Supreme Court adjudication is politics writ large—Posner
recommends that the Court be “modest” and “pragmatic.”23 Given the potency of the justices’
political power, Posner argues they should generally defer to legislative judgments. The Court
should “be restrained in the exercise of its power.”24 When this “very high threshold” for
deference is overcome, however, then the Court should embrace its political role and “focus on
the practical consequences” of its potential decisions.25 “[T]he pragmatic judge aims at the
decision that is most reasonable, all things considered, where ‘all things’ include both casespecific and systemic consequences, in their broadest sense.”26 In other words, pragmatic
adjudication is a “forward-looking” method that emphasizes consideration of immediate effects
(case-specific consequences) as well as the value of following the rule of law (systemic
consequences).27
______________________________
20
Id. at 40.
21

Id. Constitutional issues, such as the scope of free speech, are “quintessentially
political issues.” Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 231.
22

(2005)).

Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 62, 90 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183

23

Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 54, 90.

24

Id. at 102.

25

Id. at 54, 90.

26

Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 13.

27

Id. at 71.

Supreme Court Nominees - 9 Pragmatic adjudication intertwines with Posner’s notion of democratic politics. He
distinguishes between two types of democracy: deliberative and pragmatic. Deliberative
democracy is “idealistic, theoretical, and top-down.”28 Voters and elected officials reason about
“what is best for society as a whole,” and then pursue this “public interest rather than … selfish
private interests.”29 Deliberative democracy, as such, “‘gives moral argument a prominent place
in the political process.’”30 Posner rejects deliberative democracy as infeasible and normatively
unattractive, and instead endorses pragmatic democracy, which “is realistic, cynical, and bottomup.”31 Following Joseph Schumpeter, Posner views politics largely as a competition for votes
among political elites.32 More specifically, democracy is “a method by which members of a selfinterested political elite compete for the votes of a basically ignorant and apathetic, as well as
determinedly self-interested, electorate.”33 Posner insists that this form of democracy is
legitimate exactly because of its pragmatic consequences: it seems to work. And the Supreme
Court’s exercise of judicial review is legitimate for the same reason: it is pragmatically
effective. “[L]egitimacy is acceptance, and acceptance [by the American people] is … based on
practical results—on delivering the goods.”34 Thus, Posner does not pretend that pragmatic
democracy logically entails pragmatic adjudication; to the contrary, he admits that “judicial

______________________________
28
Id. at 130.
29

Id. at 131.

30

Id. at 132 (quoting Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
346 (1996)).
31

Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 131. For instance, Posner writes that deliberative
democracy “hopelessly exaggerates the moral and intellectual capacities, both actual and
potential, not only of the average person but also of the average official (including judge).” Id. at
144.
32

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942).

33

Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 16; see id. at 144 (describing pragmatic democracy).

34

Id. at 234.

Supreme Court Nominees - 10 enforcement of the Constitution truncates rather than vindicates democratic choice.”35
Regardless, from Posner’s pragmatic perspective, the effectiveness and widespread acceptance of
pragmatic judicial review establishes its “democratic legitimacy.”36
Finally, despite Posner’s emphasis on the Court’s political power, he insists that Supreme
Court decisions are “lawlike” in two ways.37 First, though the justices must be political, they
need not be partisan. Because they are appointed for life, justices are not pressured, as are
legislators, to hew to the party line; they do not fret about the party support needed for reelection.
“Democratic and Republican Justices are much less Democratic and Republican than their
counterparts in elected officialdom, often to the chagrin of the appointing Presidents.”38 Thus,
Posner concludes, “[n]onpartisanship, unlike ideological neutrality,” is not only “an attainable
ideal,” but is also “the cornerstone of a realistic conception of the ‘rule of law’—a concept, a
practice, of enormous social value.”39 Second, Posner asserts that political justices can still be
impersonal. We can expect a justice to “set to one side the personal characteristics of the
litigants.”40 Posner applauds this expectation as both “realistic” and “invaluable.” “Justice is
blindfolded in this way in order to prevent judges from being swayed by the politics,
personalities, connections, etc., of the litigants—for law administered by judges swayed in those
ways does not provide an adequate framework for an orderly and prosperous society.”41
To illustrate, what are the ramifications of pragmatic adjudication for the issue of
abortion? In 1973, Roe v. Wade held that the constitutional right of privacy protects a woman’s
______________________________
35
Id. at 232.
36

Id. at 208.

37

Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 75.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 75-76.

40

Id. at 76.

41

Id.; Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 284-85.

Supreme Court Nominees - 11 interest in choosing whether to have an abortion until viability (through the first two trimesters of
a pregnancy).42 Posner accentuates that Roe was unequivocally “a legislative judgment.”43 Of
course, from Posner’s perspective, many constitutional decisions are legislative or political
decisions; that fact alone does not reflect on a case’s legitimacy. But Posner criticizes Roe on
pragmatic grounds. Even if the justices contemplated the consequences likely to flow from its
decision, they apparently “ignored an important consequence—the stifling effect on democratic
experimentation of establishing a constitutional right to abortion.”44 Roe precluded state
legislatures from trying diverse types of restrictions on abortions and examining the varied social
and political results. According to Posner, Roe was a “bad pragmatic” decision because “the
Court’s pragmatism was one-sided.”45 Unsurprisingly, those states that maintained strict
legislative prohibitions against abortion in 1973 are the same states where women today find it
difficult to procure an abortion “because of hostility [and] intimidation.”46
B. Dworkin and Principled Adjudication
Like Posner, Dworkin distinguishes two forms of democracy—rule-bound and principlebound—which roughly correspond with Posner’s democratic types. In rule-bound communities,
on the one hand, individuals have “antagonistic interests or points of view.”47 Individuals (and
interest groups) engage in political negotiations with others in an effort to craft communal rules
that favor their respective positions. Politics is all about consequences: “each person tries to
plant the flag of his convictions over as large a domain of power or rules as possible.”48 In a
______________________________
42
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43

Posner, Law, supra note 5, at 124.

44

Id. at 125.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 210.

48

Id. at 211.

Supreme Court Nominees - 12 principle-bound community, on the other hand, individuals “accept that they are governed by
common principles, not just by rules hammered out in political compromise.”49 The mutual
commitment to principles generates a different type of politics. Politics becomes “a theater of
debate about which principles the community should adopt as a system, which view it should
take of justice, fairness, and due process.”50 Dworkin unequivocally favors a politics of
principles as the higher form of politics.51
Legal concepts, Dworkin continues, are political concepts. Legal and judicial disputes
and, more broadly, legal theories “cannot sensibly be understood as linguistic analyses, or neutral
accounts of social practices.”52 Instead, legal disputes and theories constantly question “what the
law is” and “what turns on” the various views of the law.53 “And all this is deeply, densely
political.”54 Thus, political morality is central to the law; it is, particularly, at “the heart of
constitutional law.”55 And when Dworkin asserts that legal concepts and theories are political,
he refers, of course, to a politics of principles. From Dworkin’s standpoint, then, adjudication
and jurisprudence are interpretive practices. They require an interpreter—a Supreme Court
______________________________
49
Id.
50

Id.

51

Bernard Crick gives a more traditional definition of politics.

Politics … can be simply defined as the activity by which differing interests within a
given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their
importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. And, to complete
the formal definition, a political system is that type of government where politics proves
successful in ensuring reasonable stability and order.
Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics 22 (2d ed. 1972).
52

Ronald Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald Dworkin, in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary
Jurisprudence 247, 254 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
53

Id. at 256.

54

Id.

55

Dworkin, Freedom, supra note 6, at 2.

Supreme Court Nominees - 13 justice, let’s say—to impose a purpose (or principle) on legal practice to make it “the best
possible.”56 But the interpreter cannot impose any purpose whatsoever; rather, the “history or
shape” of prior legal practice “constrains the available interpretations.”57 Interpreters (justices)
can and do disagree about how to cast specific legal concepts or broader theories of law so that
they become “the best [they] can be.”58 For instance, concepts like liberty and democracy
“function in ordinary thought and speech as interpretive concepts of value: their descriptive
sense is contested, and the contest turns on which assignment of a descriptive sense best captures
or realizes that value.”59
Dworkin’s depiction of adjudication as an interpretive practice leads to his theory of law
as integrity. This general theory of law strives “to show legal practice as a whole in its best light,
to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as [it is found] and the best justification of that
practice.”60 Judges, including Supreme Court justices, resolve disputed legal claims by looking
to two “dimensions” or factors: “fit and justification.”61 To answer a specific legal question, a
judge must articulate and apply a principle that fits prior precedents and practices. If the judge
applies a principle that does not fit—that disregards prior judicial precedents, let’s say—then the
community will have “dishonored its own principles.”62 If more than one principle fits the data
of the past, then the judge must articulate a theory (of principle) that best justifies the particular
realm of law (for instance, products liability law, or free speech law).63 That is, the judge should
______________________________
56
Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 52.
57

Id.

58

Id. at 53; see id. at 87-90 (discussing judicial interpretation and disagreements);
Dworkin, Robes, supra note 6, at 10-12 (discussing law as an interpretive concept).
59

Dworkin, Robes, supra note 6, at 150.

60

Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 90.

61

Id. at 255.

62

Id. at 257.

63

See id. at 444 n.20 (explaining how fit might not resolve some cases).

Supreme Court Nominees - 14 articulate a political and moral theory that places the prior practices into the best moral light.
And in some cases, the judge might realize that he or she needs to ascend to a higher level of
justificatory principles. The judge, for instance, might seek to justify, in the best moral light, all
of tort law or all of constitutional law. Or the judge might go even higher and attempt to justify
the entire legal system. Thus, based on the level of “justificatory ascent,”64 legal theories might
be “more or less ambitious.”65
The more ambitious try to find support for their conceptions of legality in other political
values—or rather, because the process is not one-way, they try to find support for a
conception of legality in a set of other, related, political values, each of these understood
in turn in a way that reflects and is supported by that conception of legality.66
The most ambitious (or best) judges would aim for both “a vertical and a horizontal ordering” of
the legal system.67 Precedents, rules, and principles would all be coherently integrated and
justified.68
How would Dworkin resolve Roe v. Wade, the prototype of a hard case? He begins by
examining prior cases that involved procreation, including most importantly Griswold v.
Connecticut, which held that a constitutional right of privacy allows married couples to choose to
use contraceptives.69 Dworkin reasons that a “principle of procreative autonomy” not only fits
______________________________
64
Dworkin, Robes, supra note 6, at 80.
65

Id. at 170-71.

66

Id. at 171.

67

Dworkin, Seriously, supra note 6, at 117.

68

“Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to
find, in some coherent set of principles about people’s rights and duties, the best constructive
interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their community,” Dworkin explains.
Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 255. “They try to make that complex structure and record the
best these can be.” Id.; cf., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal
Argument 7-8 (2005) (describing and criticizing Dworkin’s approach).
69

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

Supreme Court Nominees - 15 Griswold and its progeny but also best justifies those decisions from a moral standpoint.70
“Procreative decisions are fundamental … because the moral issues on which a procreative
decision hinges are religious. … They are issues touching the ultimate point and value of human
life itself.”71 Given this, Dworkin adds that integrity requires the Court to enforce the principle
of procreative autonomy in the abortion context as well.72 While political prudence might have
suggested that the Court uphold a right to use contraceptives without recognizing the more
controversial right to choose abortion, integrity forbids such pragmatic “political
compromises.”73 Indeed, instead of pragmatically retreating, Dworkin takes his argument, that
the Court rightly decided Roe, to higher levels of justificatory ascent. Procreative autonomy
embodies a higher principle of privacy, which “limits a state’s power to invade personal liberty
when the state acts, not to protect rights or interests of other people, but to safeguard an intrinsic
value.”74 And climbing even higher, Dworkin finds that privacy is an aspect of a wider politicalmoral principle: the government must “treat everyone subject to its dominion with equal concern
and respect.”75 The government, therefore, must “not infringe [individuals’] most basic

______________________________
70
Dworkin, Freedom, supra note 6, at 102.
71

Id. at 102-03.

72

Id. at 102-04.

73

Id. at 103.

74

Id. at 101. Dworkin adds:

A state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value, (1) when the
decisions it forbids are matters of personal commitment on essentially religious issues,
(2) when the community is divided about what the best understanding of the value in
question requires, and (3) when the decision has very great and disparate impact on the
person whose decision is displaced.
Id. at 101-02.
75

Id. at 73.

Supreme Court Nominees - 16 freedoms, those liberties essential, as one prominent jurist put it, to the very idea of ‘ordered
liberty.’”76
C. Adjudication and Politics
Despite the tensions between Posner’s and Dworkin’s respective approaches, they both
view adjudication as politics writ large. To be sure, Dworkin’s theory of adjudication is not as
conspicuously political as Posner’s for at least two reasons. First, Posner’s position is
transparent: in no uncertain terms, he declares that Supreme Court decision making is
expansively political. Dworkin’s arguments are far more complex; discerning the elements of
Dworkin’s multilayered philosophical contentions requires greater degrees of perspicacity and
effort. Second, the political elements of Posner’s theory can be readily grasped because Posner
invokes a familiar type of democratic politics that has predominated in the United States since
World War II. Posner explicitly follows Joseph Schumpeter, but Schumpeter was merely one of
numerous political theorists who articulated various forms of pluralist democracy during the
postwar years. Pluralist democratic theories maintained (and still maintain) that politics is about
the pursuit of self-interest. Democracy is a set of processes that structures how individuals and
interest groups push, negotiate, and compromise in their struggles to satisfy their preexisting
desires.77 Dworkin rejects this now commonplace concept of democratic politics (at least in
adjudication), but he does not repudiate politics; rather, he articulates a different form of
democratic politics, a politics of principles. Thus, he unequivocally declares that law must be a
“political enterprise.”78 “[A]n interpretation of any body or division of law … must show the
______________________________
76
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
77

E.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (1989); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to
Democratic Theory (1956); see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in
America: A History (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2008) (describing the historical
development of pluralist democracy); Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different
Democratic Regimes, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 47, 57-62 (2006) (same).
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Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in The Politics of Interpretation 249, 264 (W.J.
Thomas Mitchell ed., 1983).

Supreme Court Nominees - 17 value of that body of law in political terms by demonstrating the best principle or policy it can be
taken to serve.”79 For this reason, Dworkin calls for “a fusion of constitutional law and moral
theory”80—where moral theory encompasses “political morality”81 and “political theory.”82 Law
and politics must be joined. Unsurprisingly, then, critics from both the political right and left
attack Dworkin for advocating “judicial lawmaking”83—that is, “judicial legislation—judges
making law, not interpreting it.”84
So, no less than Posner, Dworkin advocates for an adjudicative politics writ large. The
differences between Posner and Dworkin lie largely in their distinctive conceptualizations of
politics. To Posner, politics requires a pragmatic emphasis on future consequences. Politics is
governed by interest, not principle. Moral philosophy and abstract theory are mostly irrelevant
in Posner’s world, “with its unillusioned understanding of human nature.”85 Thus, for Posner,
Supreme Court adjudication should be no less pragmatic than is democratic politics.
______________________________
79
Id.
80

Dworkin, Seriously, supra note 6, at 149 (emphasis added).

81

Ronald Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A Matter of
Principle 119, 143 (1985).
82

Id. Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming, who interpret and follow Dworkin, prefer
to talk of a fusion of constitutional law with “moral philosophy,” though they define moral
philosophy to include “political philosophy.” Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming,
Constitutional Interpretation 29 n.42 (2007). They then assert that Dworkin “blurs” any possible
distinction between moral philosophy and political philosophy “by speaking of normative
questions of justification in constitutional interpretation as matters of ‘political morality.’” Id.
(citing Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 143-45, 165 (1985)).
83

Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation 41, 58 (1999).
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Barber & Fleming, supra note 82, at 95; see Robert Bork, The Tempting of America
214 (1990) (arguing that Dworkin’s approach would empower judges “to force a better moral
philosophy upon a people that votes to the contrary”); Whittington, supra note 83, at 54 (arguing
that Dworkin advocates for “judicial activism”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 85 n.336 (1994) (arguing that, contrary
to a method of fidelity, “Dworkin’s method [apparently] would entail much more in the way of
policymaking and principle-espousing discretion for the judge”). See generally Barber &
Fleming, supra note 82, at 91-107 (discussing criticisms of Dworkin).
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Posner, Law, supra note 5, at ix.

Supreme Court Nominees - 18 Adjudication is not grounded on some higher principles or the requirements of democratic
processes. Adjudication is legitimate precisely because it is pragmatic—it works and is widely
accepted. Dworkin views politics contrariwise: principle, not interest, should govern.
Dworkin’s approach might not correspond with the currently predominant conception of
democracy, but it nonetheless remains politics, albeit in a highly abstract and stylized form. To
Dworkin, then, adjudication should be as principled as is democracy. Judges resolving concrete
legal disputes often must advert to abstract political-moral principles and sometimes must ascend
to the highest levels of moral and political theory. Adjudication and democracy must logically
cohere in a government of integrity: adjudication is legitimate precisely because it harmonizes
with a government of principles.86
Both Posner’s and Dworkin’s theories are important partly because they impugn
traditional legal scholarship and its assumption that judicial decision making is distinct from
politics. Legal scholars—like most judges and attorneys, as well as senators in Supreme Court
confirmation hearings—usually assume that the justices resolve cases by analyzing and applying
legal doctrines embodied in precedents, statutes, and the Constitution. Most legal scholars,
Posner observes, continue “to pretend that the Justices are engaged in a primarily analytical
exercise that seeks ‘correct’ answers to technical legal questions.”87 If a scholar wishes to
criticize a specific Court decision, the scholar demonstrates either how the justices “got the law
wrong,” or perhaps even worse, how the justices followed their politics instead of the law.88 By
stressing that politics influences Supreme Court adjudication, both Posner and Dworkin
______________________________
86
Posner recognizes the implications of Dworkin’s broad definition of law. “When law is
defined to include, under the rubric of ‘principle,’ the ethical and political norms that judges use
to decide the most difficult cases, decision according to law and decision according to political
preference become difficult, sometimes impossible, to distinguish in a society as morally
heterogeneous as ours.” Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 22 (1990).
87
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Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 49.

Id. at 34; cf., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959) (arguing that the Court errs when it does not decide in accordance with
neutral principles).

Supreme Court Nominees - 19 challenge “the way more familiar to lawyers, law professors, and judges.”89 Needless to say,
though, if Posner and Dworkin are correct—if Supreme Court adjudication is politics writ
large—then any Supreme Court nominee who declares that he or she will apolitically decide
cases in accordance with the rule of law is either purposefully lying or naively ignorant.
II. Adjudication as Politics Writ Small
Despite their significance, Posner and Dworkin both seriously overstate their cases.
Supreme Court adjudication is political, but it is politics writ small rather than writ large.
Despite Posner’s assertions, the rule of law is more than merely being nonpartisan and
impersonal.90 A judge, or more to the point, a Supreme Court justice, interprets legal texts,
whether constitutional provisions, precedents, or otherwise, and usually applies the best
interpretation to resolve specific cases. Courts decide cases in accordance with “authoritative
texts,” to use Posner’s terminology.91 Yet, legal interpretation is inherently political, whether at
the Supreme Court or lower court level. When a justice interprets, let’s say, the first amendment,
______________________________
89
Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 33. Many contemporary law professors
acknowledge that adjudication often is not mechanical. Judges (including Supreme Court
justices) should follow legal rules, these contemporary law professors explain, but sometimes a
rule is ambiguous or conflicts with other rules. In such cases, law professors admit, judicial
decision making becomes more political. Judges must turn to policy considerations to fill the
legal gaps or resolve the conflicts. Even so, these legal scholars still sharply separate law and
politics. The influence of politics (or policy considerations) supposedly is neatly cabined:
judges should turn to policy only if and when “the law runs out.” Frederick Schauer, Judging in
a Corner of the Law, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1717, 1729 (1988); cf., Friedman, supra note 8, at 25760 (criticizing traditional normative legal scholarship for ignoring politics).
90

Posner’s assertion, that we can reasonably expect a judge (including a Supreme Court
justice) to disregard the personal characteristics of a litigant, is questionable. Empirical studies
suggest that judges are often influenced by factors such as religion. See Stephen M. Feldman,
Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision Making, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 43, 45-52
(2006) (summarizing empirical research on the influence of religion). For instance, in one
extensive study, the authors concluded: “In our study of religious freedom decisions, the single
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demographics of the community.” Gregory C. Sisk, et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 614
(2004). In another study, the author identified factors that influence judges’ decisions regarding
gay rights. Daniel R. Pinello, Gay Rights and American Law (2003).
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Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 40.

Supreme Court Nominees - 20 the justice’s political ideology necessarily shapes his or her understanding of the provision.
Politics always contributes to judicial decision making, but this contribution does not engender
bald political pronouncements, whether derived from pragmatic concerns or moral theorizing. In
other words, Supreme Court decision making is usually politics writ small.92
A. On Interpretation
The interpretation of legal texts is never mechanical—never the mere implementation of
a method that cuts directly to the truth of the text.93 No justice, or lower court judge for that
matter, can directly access some plain meaning supposedly embodied in a text. Rather, a justice
always gleans textual meaning from her own perspective. And her perspective arises from a
variety of sources, including cultural background, religious orientation, social position, economic
wealth, partisan commitments, and political morality. To put this in Gadamerian terms, a justice
can see or understand a legal text only from her interpretive “horizon,” with political ideology—
including pragmatic concerns and political morality—constituting one significant aspect of the
horizon.94
As Hans-Georg Gadamer explains, an individual’s horizon simultaneously enables and
constrains her interpretation (or understanding) of a text. Each of us is socialized within certain
communal traditions, which inculcate us with expectations, interests, and prejudices. Our
expectations, interests, and prejudices—encompassing our political ideologies—open us to the
text, give us an initial direction or outlook, and thus enable us to discern the text’s meaning.
Without our expectations, interests, and prejudices, the text would be a blank, without meaning.
______________________________
92
See Friedman, supra note 8, at 333 (“Politics and law are not separate, they are
symbiotic”). For a collection of essays emphasizing the intersection and interplay of law and
politics in Supreme Court adjudication, see The Supreme Court and American Political
Development (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
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The lack of a method that can guide interpretive or hermeneutic practices is the ironic
point of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s title to his book, Truth and Method. No method can reveal an
objective truth or meaning for a text. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method xxi, 295, 309
(Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989).
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Id. at 282-84, 302, 306.

Supreme Court Nominees - 21 We would not have a place to start (imagine trying to understand a text if you did not know any
language). Yet, our expectations, interests, and prejudices also constrain our possible
understandings of a text. One can see within the range of the interpretive horizon, but cannot see
beyond the horizon’s edge. When we turn to a text, we can perceive its meaning, but our
perceptions are necessarily limited.95
If my interpretation of a specific text contravenes that of another interpreter, then I can
try to persuade him or her of the correctness of my interpretation. Indeed, each interpreter might
press his or her interpretation as the best, until and unless one is persuaded otherwise. We
reasonably discuss textual meaning—we debate which meaning constitutes the best
interpretation—even though we can never prove that one particular interpretation is necessarily
right. While a right or best answer (or interpretation) might exist, it cannot be proven because
textual meaning cannot be discovered through some mechanical or methodical process. In short,
interpretation is not a mathematics problem. In Dworkin’s words, there is “no algorithm” to
ascertain the right answer.96 Yet, the lack of an indubitable conclusion does not manifest a
failure; rather, it reflects the nature of the interpretive process itself.97

______________________________
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For more extensive discussions of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, see Georgia Warnke,
Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (1987); Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s
Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (1985); Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of
Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 Contemp.
Pol. Theory 296, 301-03 (2005); Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The
Interdependence of Deconstruction and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 Phil. & Soc. Criticism
51, 53-63 (2000). For applications of Gadamerian philosophy to jurisprudence, see Stephen M.
Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166 (1996); Stephen M.
Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 661
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609
(1990); Francis J. Mootz, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of
Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 523 (1988).
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Ronald Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in A Matter of Principle 146, 160 (1985).

See Feldman, supra note 8, at 99-103 (discussing disagreements among interpreters).
“[I]t is the law itself … on which a decision properly rests and on the basis of which, carefully
articulated, it commands assent. A decision is not a proof; it does not afford certainty, and
reasonable persons may disagree.” Weinreb, supra note 68, at 92.

Supreme Court Nominees - 22 If this picture accurately depicts the process of legal interpretation, then why do lawyers
and judges so often agree on the meaning of particular texts? Is not each interpreter locked
within his or her own respective horizon or perspective? And if so, then how can there be easy
cases, where most lawyers and judges agree on the result? The answer to these questions lies in
the communal quality of interpretation. Each individual does not merely have his or her own
private horizon of expectations, interests, and prejudices; rather, each person’s horizon is
engendered by the community’s traditions, cultures, societal structures, and so forth. Thus, many
lawyers and judges share overlapping horizons encompassing generally uncontested cultural
values and societal practices. Lawyers and judges participate in the same or overlapping (legal)
communities and consequently share traditions, which in turn generate similar expectations,
interests, and prejudices.
The purpose of law school, to a great degree, is to acculturate a student—a would-be
lawyer—to the traditions of the legal profession so that the student is imbued with the proper
expectations, interests, and prejudices. The student will (or should) have learned the methods (or
know-how) appropriate to discussing and resolving legal issues.98 After a student finishes a
course in constitutional law, for instance, the student will know that constitutional issues can be
legitimately resolved by reference to, among other things, constitutional text, framers’ intentions,
and governmental structures, but not by reference to the Sunday comics. A student who attends
pharmacy school instead of law school, meanwhile, will not be equipped with the know-how
appropriate to interpreting legal texts in accordance with professional norms (though the
pharmacy student will have the know-how to understand a doctor’s instructions regarding
pharmaceutical prescriptions). The pharmacy student might realize that reliance on the Sunday

______________________________
98
See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 135, 137 (2006) (emphasizing how law students are socialized).

Supreme Court Nominees - 23 comics would be inappropriate, but might not know that reference to the framers’ intentions or
governmental structures would be legitimate.99
B. The Institution of the Supreme Court in Relation to Legal Interpretation
Given Posner’s and Dworkin’s arguments that Supreme Court justices engage in politics
writ large, one must ask why a justice should even bother interpreting ‘relevant’ legal texts. If
the politics-writ-large thesis is valid, why would a justice not ignore the texts and vote according
to her political ideology? In fact, such a scenario is possible. Justices are empowered to decide
cases precisely because they are Supreme Court justices. That is, a justice’s structural position—
as a Supreme Court justice—within the institutions of our governmental system enables her to
cast a vote in resolving a case before the Court. A justice is not empowered to vote because she
is especially skilled at deciphering the best interpretation of a legal text (though such skill might
have contributed to her appointment to the Supreme Court).100 Consequently, in any particular
case, a justice can disregard the relevant texts, or can disingenuously interpret the texts (not
seeking the best interpretation), but still the justice is structurally (or institutionally) empowered
to cast a vote. In such circumstances, the justice could vote based solely on political ideology.
______________________________
99
Philip Bobbitt argues that judges can draw on six “modalities of argument” to decide
constitutional cases legitimately:
historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution);
textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be
interpreted by the average contemporary “man on the street”); structural (inferring rules
from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up);
doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those
moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and
prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule).
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Constitutional
Interpretation]; see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (1982) (elaborating the modalities of
constitutional argument). I do not agree with Bobbitt’s suggestion that the six modalities of
argument are, in a sense, a closed set. To me, the sources informing constitutional interpretation
can always be contested.
100

Justice Robert Jackson once wrote: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the result) (quoted in Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 60 n.98).

Supreme Court Nominees - 24 While possible, such a scenario is unlikely. Why so? Why are justices likely to follow
their best interpretive judgments of legal texts rather than casting them off in favor of a politics
writ large? First, certain cultural traditions surround the structural position of a Supreme Court
justice within the institution of the federal judiciary. These cultural traditions include
professional norms and duties, which demand that justices identify and refer to relevant legal
texts when deciding a case. Unsurprisingly, then, the justices not only discuss relevant
precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions in their judicial opinions, but they also discuss
such doctrinal sources when in conference with each other.101 The justices might feasibly write
their opinions for public consumption, to help legitimate their decisions, but they do not debate
the meanings of legal texts during post-oral argument conferences for public consumption—
because the public is not present to observe the discussions. 102 Indeed, the justices often bargain
and negotiate among themselves about the contents of their majority opinions, as if the precise
wording of a single paragraph or even a single sentence made a difference.103 My point here is
not that the justices deliberate together, where one might change the mind of another. As Posner
points out, the justices rarely influence each other during post-oral argument conferences.104
Henry Hart’s admonition that the justices must allow sufficient time for “the maturing of
collective thought” was a legal-process “pipe dream,” as Posner phrases it.105 Regardless, the
______________________________
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See Lindquist & Klein, supra note 98, at 137 (emphasizing how the justices appear to
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Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
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Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
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Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 72-75.

Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84,
100 (1959); Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 60; see Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal
Thought From Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage 119-36 (2000)
(explaining legal process scholarship).

Supreme Court Nominees - 25 fact that the justices make up their own minds, uninfluenced by the other justices, does not
diminish the importance that the justices place on the relevant legal texts. They take seriously
their professional duties to interpret precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions.106 Even
Posner, at one point, admits that the justices “believe they conform” to a “law-constrained”
conception of judicial decision making.107
Second, and most important, the justices (and other judges) rarely will experience any
tension or conflict between their political views and their best interpretations of the relevant legal
texts. Politics and interpretation are likely to coincide. This correspondence is not merely
fortuitous; it arises because of the nature of the interpretive process itself. Political ideology
shapes a justice’s horizon, which in turn shapes the justice’s interpretation of legal texts. In other
words, a justice will usually experience a correspondence between her political views and her
interpretive judgments exactly because political ideology constitutes an integral part of the
interpretive process. Legal interpretation is politics writ small: politics ensconced within the
interpretive process.
Given that legal interpretation is politics writ small, the likelihood of experiencing
conflict between political and interpretive judgments is remote. The justices can sincerely fulfill
their institutional duty to follow the rule of law, even as they simultaneously follow their own
political ideologies. A crucial point here is that, for the most part, the justices are not
disingenuous. Their best interpretive judgments do correspond with their political preferences
exactly because their politics constitute a substantial portion of their interpretive horizons. For
this reason, the justices rarely need to choose between their political ideologies and the best
interpretive result (and following professional norms). They need not choose because they do
not perceive a choice. They can have their cake and eat it too: they can follow the rule of law,
______________________________
106
See, e.g., Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 99, at 12-22 (describing
how judges can draw on six modalities of argument to decide constitutional cases legitimately).
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Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 52.

Supreme Court Nominees - 26 as they interpret it, without political compunction.108 And because legal interpretation is politics
writ small, Supreme Court decision making is rarely politics writ large. The justices are unlikely
to contemplate baldly and boldly asserting their political ideologies because they would not see
any (political) advantage in doing so. They can follow professional norms, sincerely interpreting
legal texts, while simultaneously gratifying their political desires, albeit tacitly.109
C. The Implications of an Adjudicative Politics Writ Small for Dworkin and Posner
Dworkin would agree with my assertion that the justices typically follow their best
interpretive judgments, even though (or because) those judgments are partly political. Whereas
Posner separates law and politics—Supreme Court adjudication is political rather than legal—
Dworkin includes politics within law—within the interpretive process. In his early writings,
Dworkin explicitly emphasized this point, that political-moral principles were part of the legal
system.110 More recently, he has claimed that he no longer cares about this “taxonomic”
question: whether principles should be categorized as law.111 Even so, he still depicts ‘law as
integrity’ as “theory-embedded,” where political-moral principles and abstract theory are part of
(or embedded inside) legal reasoning.112 Thus, while he no longer finds the taxonomic question
worth debating, his approach at least implicitly places political-moral principles and theory
within the legal process. And precisely because of the prominence he affords to political
morality, Dworkin contends that he “explains why both scholars and journalists find it
reasonably easy to classify judges as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative.’”113 Dworkin elaborates:
______________________________
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Cf., Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 Duke
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Supreme Court Nominees - 27 The best explanation of the differing patterns of [judges’] decisions lies in their different
understandings of central moral values embedded in the Constitution’s text. Judges
whose political convictions are conservative will naturally interpret abstract
constitutional principles in a conservative way, as they did in the early years of [the
twentieth century]. Judges whose convictions are more liberal will naturally interpret
those principles in a liberal way, as they did in the halcyon days of the Warren Court.114
Regardless of whether Dworkin places political morality inside or outside law, he
ultimately exaggerates the role of political ideology, as does Posner. Of course, Dworkin and
Posner describe politics in strikingly different ways. Dworkin, in a sense, tries to tame the
interpretive process through his description of politics as principle. He recognizes that
interpretation can never be reduced to a mechanical method, but he nonetheless attempts to
channel it so that only certain aspects of the interpretive horizon are relevant to adjudication. In
reality, an individual’s interpretive horizon is a messy conglomeration of innumerable
interrelated factors, including cultural background, social position, economic wealth, and
political ideology. Yet Dworkin, when describing adjudication, wants to isolate political
ideology as the primary if not sole determinant of a judge’s interpretation of ambiguous legal
texts. Moreover, he then wants to stylize political ideology so that it entails a judge’s selfconscious contemplation of only political-moral principles and theory. But neither interpretive
horizons, in general, nor political ideologies, more specifically, can be forced into these boxes.
Dworkin’s notion of politics as principle is too idealized to describe accurately the political
motivations of either legislators or judges. For instance, many political scientists cite empirical
studies to support an “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court adjudication:115 researchers predict
variations in Supreme Court decisions because the justices vote their “personal policy
______________________________
114
Id. at 2-3.
115

Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 6469 (1993).

Supreme Court Nominees - 28 preferences.”116 As Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth declare: “Simply put, [William]
Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall
voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.”117 Even if the attitudinal model overly
simplifies the justices’ voting behaviors,118 Dworkin wrongly dismisses the influence crass
political incentives like self-interest exert on adjudication.
But exactly because Dworkin reduces politics to principle, he then comfortably bloats its
importance in adjudication, which he consequently transforms into politics writ large. Again,
Dworkin’s adjudication is not a politics writ large of preferences and interests, but a politics writ
large of political-moral principles and theory. Dworkin, in effect, wants to magnify one element
of political ideology—namely political morality—so that it not only overwhelms other political
factors but also becomes the determinative force in adjudicating hard cases. Hence, Dworkin
errs similarly to Posner. Posner casts Supreme Court adjudication as a politics writ large of
pragmatic self-interest, and in doing so, he overlooks the actual though more limited role that
pragmatic self-interest plays in legal interpretation. Likewise, Dworkin casts Supreme Court
adjudication as a politics writ large of political morality, and in doing so, he overlooks the actual
though more limited role that political morality plays in legal interpretation. Political ideology,
including pragmatic self-interest and political morality, always contributes to a justice’s
______________________________
116
Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
Institutionalist Approaches 1, 1 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). Gillman
and Clayton criticize the attitudinal model as being too simplistic. Id. at 3-7.
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Political scientists have never persuasively demonstrated that legal doctrine does not
influence judicial decision making. Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial
Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & Soc. Inquiry 465
(2001). To the contrary, some recent empirical studies conclude that legal doctrines (or
“jurisprudential regimes”) shape judicial decisions. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards,
Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and
Establishment Clause Cases, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 827, 839 (2003); Richards & Kritzer, supra
note 103, at 305-07; see Lindquist & Klein, supra note 98, at 148-57 (arguing that both political
ideology and jurisprudential considerations influence justices).

Supreme Court Nominees - 29 interpretive horizon and thus always influences the interpretation of legal texts. But political
ideology does not exhaust the interpretive horizon and does not completely determine
adjudicative outcomes.
A justice’s interpretive horizon encompasses many factors that ordinarily remain tacit,
resting quietly in the background. These factors wield influence as the justice interprets the
relevant legal texts, but the justice usually does not dwell on any specific factor. Instead, the
justice focuses on interpreting the relevant legal texts as best as possible. To be certain, in any
particular case, the justice could become aware of one such interpretive factor, could bring it
from the background to the foreground, and could focus her analysis around this factor. But in
doing so, the justice would risk grating against the professional norms of the judiciary. For
example, religious orientation typically contributes to an individual’s interpretive horizon, but a
justice who overtly relied on religious beliefs to resolve a judicial dispute would clearly violate
the expectations for the judicial office.119 A justice who openly voted in accordance with
pragmatic self-interest would likewise be criticized for disregarding professional norms. And a
justice who overtly philosophized about a theory of political morality to decide a case (or cast a
vote) would at least be questioned on professional grounds: the justice, critics would
sarcastically charge, thought she was a professional philosopher rather than a lawyer and judge.
In the words of Robert Bork, if the Constitution speaks ambiguously on a particular issue, such
as whether the death penalty is permissible, then “[i]t does no good to dress the issue up as one in
moral philosophy.”120 Philosophical theorists, like Dworkin, seek “the subversion of the law’s
foundations.”121

______________________________
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See Feldman, supra note 90, at 45-52 (discussing empirical research showing that
religion influences judges).
120

Bork, supra note 84, at 214.

121

Id. at 136.

Supreme Court Nominees - 30 Dworkin anticipates this potential critique of his argument. He describes this
“professional objection” as follows:122
‘We’re just lawyers here. We’re not philosophers. Law has its own discipline, its own
special craft. When you go to law school, you are taught what it is to think like a lawyer,
not a philosopher. Lawyers do not try to decide vast theoretical issues of moral or
political theory. They decide particular issues at retail, one by one, in a more limited and
circumscribed way. Their vehicles of argument are not the grand ones of the
philosophical treatise, but the more homespun and reliable methods of close textual
analysis and analogy.’123
Unsurprisingly, given Dworkin’s anticipation of the ‘professional objection,’ he offers a
response.
[Reflective people reason] from the inside out. They begin with a particular concrete
problem, and with reasons to worry whether they can defend their position against
objections that it is arbitrary or inconsistent with their other views or convictions. Their
own sense of intellectual, moral, and professional responsibility, therefore, dictates how
general a ‘theory’ they must construct or entertain to put these doubts to rest. When their
responsibility is particularly great—as it is for political officials—they might well think it
appropriate to test their reflections against the more comprehensive and developed
accounts of other people, including moral and legal philosophers, who have devoted a
great deal of time to worrying about the issues in play. People turn to these sources not
with the expectation of finding definitive answers—they know that the sources will
disagree among themselves—but rather for rigorous tests of their convictions, for fresh
ideas if they find that their convictions need repair, and, often, for theoretical guidance

______________________________
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Supreme Court Nominees - 31 they can follow in reworking their opinions into more accurate and better-supported
convictions.124
In other words, Dworkin maintains that Supreme Court justices and other judges, as
reflective people, sometimes not only rely explicitly on professional philosophers but do so out
of judicial (professional) duty. This assertion borders on the absurd, as demonstrated by Posner
himself. Even Dworkin acknowledges Posner’s remarkable academic and judicial capabilities:
“Judge Richard Posner—you know, the lazy judge who writes a book before breakfast, decides
several cases before noon, teaches all afternoon at the Chicago Law School, and performs brain
surgery after dinner.”125 Seemingly, if any contemporary judge could measure up to Dworkin’s
ideal judge, Hercules—that paragon of philosophically principled adjudication—it would be
Posner.126 Yet, Posner claims not even to try. Why does Dworkin allow his argument to drift
into Neverland, into the realm of the ridiculous? In part, Dworkin loses his bearings because he
does not recognize the distance between professional philosophers and other Americans,
including most intellectuals. Philosophers themselves cultivate this chasmal distance. They
have constructed a professional discipline that requires arcane knowledge supposedly beyond the
ken of other individuals (read: those who have not attained a Ph.D. in philosophy). To be clear,
philosophers are no different from other academic professionals in this regard.127 But given the
nature of academic professionalism, justices and other judges are unlikely to read philosophy
journals for guidance in legal questions. Philosophy journals are written for professional
philosophers, not for well-educated Americans. Dworkin’s error here might be due to his own
position within the academy. He has purposely become a public intellectual who tries to
______________________________
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Cf., Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law
Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. Legal Educ. 471, 473-87 (2004)
(describing the law professor’s development as an academic professional).

Supreme Court Nominees - 32 communicate with the intelligentsia (however small it might be).128 He has published numerous
essays, for instance, in the New York Review of Books.129 And indeed, Dworkin’s efforts have
brought him more renown than is common for an academic, but it has simultaneously provoked
some other professional philosophers to heap ad hominem scorn on him.130 Regardless of
Dworkin’s own status as a public intellectual and professional philosopher, most of his
contemporary academic philosophers are not frequently read by anyone other than philosophy
professors and students. John Locke and David Hume have not published recently in the Journal
of Philosophy or the Philosophical Review. 131
To be clear, my criticism of Dworkin’s approach as too stylized and extreme (and thus
too unrealistic) does not mean that the Supreme Court justices and other judges should never
consider political morality. Certainly, judges might contemplate the political morality and theory
of the American governmental system to help resolve certain issues, including some
constitutional questions.132 For example, during the World War II era, the justices sometimes
______________________________
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See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1962) (describing the
rise of American anti-intellectualism).
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Most of the essays in his book, Freedom’s Law, were first published in the New York
Review of Books. Dworkin, Freedom, supra note 6, at 391-92.
130

E.g., Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st
Century, 36 Rutgers L.J. 165 (2004) (dismissing Dworkin as a has-been); see Michael Steven
Green, Dworkin v. The Philosophers: A Review Essay on Justice in Robes, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1477 (discussing the widespread disdain for Dworkin’s philosophy among professional
philosophers).
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Much has been written about how law review articles have little influence today on
judicial decision making. Feldman, supra note 127, at 487-89; Michael D. McClintock, The
Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 659
(1998). Common sense suggests that philosophy publications would have even less influence on
judges.
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Thus, my repudiation of Dworkin’s approach does not translate into an endorsement of
judicial minimalism, where judges would largely be limited to reasoning by analogy from case
precedents. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(1999). Sunstein’s mistake is, in a sense, the mirror image of Dworkin’s mistake. Both theorists
seek to constrain justices in extreme ways: Dworkin by limiting the justices to abstract
philosophical theorizing about political morality, and Sunstein by limiting them chiefly to
narrow and shallow decisions based on stilted analogical reasoning.

Supreme Court Nominees - 33 contemplated the nature of democracy when deciding free-expression disputes.133 In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which held in 1943 that a public school’s
compulsory flag salute violated the first amendment, Justice Robert Jackson reasoned: “We set
up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any
legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not
public opinion by authority.”134 Even in those cases, however, the justices fell far short of the
sustained philosophical theorizing that Dworkin encourages. The extraordinary former Harvard
law professor Felix Frankfurter, more than any other justice, might have most nearly approached
Dworkin’s ideals. Dissenting in Barnette, Frankfurter argued that the judicial enforcement of
first-amendment rights would ultimately undermine democracy.
Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech much
which should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside of their vindication in
courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against
unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.135
But even Frankfurter would have disappointed Dworkin. As a justice, Frankfurter was limited to
writing judicial opinions—albeit, in some instances, unusually long ones. He might occasionally
rely on his notion of democratic theory, but he still could not write a treatise on political theory
and morality. He had another case to decide, another opinion to write. And most frequently—as
was true in his Barnette dissent—Frankfurter invoked democratic theory only to justify deferring
______________________________
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Supreme Court Nominees - 34 to a legislative determination, not to facilitate the judicial articulation of substantive politicalmoral principles.136
D. When Political and Interpretive Judgments Diverge
When the justices decide a case, they generally follow professional norms and sincerely
attempt to interpret the relevant texts as best as possible. But, because interpretation is political,
a justice’s best interpretation of a text usually coincides with the justice’s political ideology.
Legal interpretation and, therefore, Supreme Court decision making are politics writ small. And
because Supreme Court adjudication is politics writ small, the justices are unlikely to perceive a
need to engage in politics writ large, whether of the Posnerian or Dworkinian variety. Yet, any
individual justice can occasionally experience a conflict between interpretive judgment and
political ideology. Politics always is part of interpretation, but it is never the whole of
interpretation. Because politics contributes to but does not completely fill a justice’s interpretive
horizon, a justice might realize in any particular case that her interpretive judgment does not
coincide with her political ideology, whether based on pragmatic concerns or political morality.
In such cases, given the justice’s institutional position—she is empowered to vote as a Supreme
Court justice—she must choose between two paths: follow her interpretive judgment, or follow
her politics. Evidence suggests that, in these rare situations, the justices have in different cases
gone down both respective paths. So, for instance, as Posner acknowledges, “empirical studies
of the voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices never find that [political] ideology explains
anywhere near 100% of the Justices’ votes.”137 Indeed, he believes “Justice Scalia when he says
that his vote to hold flag burning constitutionally privileged was contrary to his legislative
preferences.”138 Posner suggests that the justices are most likely to disregard their political
______________________________
136
E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality
opinion) (reasoning that the nature of democracy renders the drawing of congressional district
lines a political question and therefore nonjusticiable).
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Id. at 50 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). Posner also believes “Justice
Thomas when he says he wouldn’t vote for a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy even as he

Supreme Court Nominees - 35 inclinations (and thus follow their interpretive judgments) in cases involving relatively “trivial
[political] issues.”139 “No one (except, naturally enough, the two military veterans on the
Supreme Court—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens—both of whom dissented in the
flag-burning cases) could get excited over flag burning.”140 And, to be sure, if one were to target
a recent case where the justices seemed most obviously to follow their politics instead of their
interpretive judgments, it would be Bush v. Gore, where the political stakes were momentous. In
a five-to-four decision, the five most conservative justices voted together, relying on a novel
equal protection argument to hold in favor of George W. Bush, thus effectively installing him as
President.141
Two points about such cases—when interpretive judgments and politics diverge—should
be emphasized. First, to identify a case when a justice’s interpretive judgment and political
ideology conflicted will always be problematic. A researcher cannot know for certain what
constituted a justice’s best interpretive judgment. The researcher, like anybody else, can only
interpret the legal materials to arrive at his or her own best interpretive judgment—a process
which is never mechanical—and then the researcher must conjecture about whether the justice
would have arrived at the same conclusion (given the justice’s known political-interpretive
propensities). A justice’s declarations about such conflict might be helpful in identifying cases,
yet a researcher should be skeptical, given that such declarations will often be self-serving. A
justice is far more likely to pronounce a conflict when he or she then claims to follow the law,

dissented from the decision invalidating such laws.” Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter explained in their joint opinion that they would vote to reaffirm
the “central holding” of Roe v. Wade despite “whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us
may have, not for overruling it.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Supreme Court Nominees - 36 not politics—like Scalia in the flag burning case. After all, the justice will be proclaiming his
own supposed neutrality and objectivity, his own professionalism—since he supposedly
disregarded his political ideology. Meanwhile, in a case like Bush v. Gore, where the justices
seem to follow their politics, they are unlikely to admit as much—because they then would be
admitting they had contravened professional norms.142
Second, and most significant, such cases of conflict will be rare. A justice’s political
ideology, as a constitutive component of her interpretive horizon, will lead the justice to interpret
relevant legal texts congruously with her politics. Such correspondence between interpretive
judgment and politics will, of course, seem serendipitous—isn’t it funny how my interpretation
of the Constitution so often fits my political ideology?—but it’s not. It’s built into the structure
of the interpretive process itself. Unlike Dworkin’s and Posner’s respective depictions of
adjudication as politics writ large, my description of adjudication as politics writ small does not
unrealistically twist or stylize judicial decision making. Instead, Supreme Court adjudication as
politics writ small accounts for the contributions of political ideology inherent within the
interpretive and judicial processes.143
______________________________
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For a more extensive discussion of cases of conflict, see Feldman, supra note 8, at 11016.
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See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard
Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin, reprinted in There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech and it’s a Good
Thing, Too 200 (1994) (criticizing Posner for moving from a pragmatist philosophy to a
pragmatist program that advocated for the Court to decide in a pragmatist fashion). A recent
empirical study of the federal courts of appeals supports the thesis that adjudication is politics
writ small. The authors concluded that “in some contexts, [judges’] political commitments very
much influence their votes.” Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301, 350 (2004). Yet the authors add:
“But this is only part of the story. It would be possible to see our data as suggesting that most of
the time, the law is what matters, not ideology.” Id. at 336. The authors emphasize, in
particular, “the disciplining effect of precedent and law—a factor that might be labeled
‘professionalism,’” as well as the influence of “legal and political culture.” Id. The authors
expanded their discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006). See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative
Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell
L. Rev. 873 (2008) (reviewing Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(2007)) (discussing empirical research showing that political ideology moderately affects judicial
decision making). For additional empirically-grounded discussions focusing on the interplay of
doctrine and politics in the lower courts, compare James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals:

Supreme Court Nominees - 37 E. A Source of Disagreement Between Posner and Dworkin
Posner and Dworkin both depict adjudication as politics writ large, yet ironically, each
conceives of adjudicative politics in a way that precludes his counterpart’s approach. Posner
recommends that Supreme Court justices resolve cases pragmatically, deciding so as to achieve
the best consequences. From Posner’s vantage, Dworkinian political-moral theorizing should
not and, in fact, cannot guide adjudication. “[T]he analytical tools employed in academic
moralism—whether moral casuistry, or reasoning from the canonical texts of moral philosophy,
or reflective equilibrium, or some combination of these tools—are too feeble to override either
narrow self-interest or moral intuitions.”144 Consequently, Posner observes, “academic moralism
is helpless when intuitions clash or self-interest opposes, and otiose when they line up.”145
Indeed, according to Posner, political-moral theorizing not only is irrelevant to adjudication but
also is extraneous to moral judgments.146 Dworkin is no less harsh in his criticism of Posner.
Principled adjudication, Dworkin insists, must uphold law as integrity. But in Posner’s
pragmatic adjudication, as disparaged by Dworkin, “the truth of propositions of law is a wasteful
distraction from the goal that [judges] should pursue single-mindedly, which is the improvement
of their political community.”147 Ultimately, Posner’s “pragmatism comes to nothing” precisely
because it lacks the grounding of a political-moral theory.148 Although Posner “insists that
U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 Am. Pol. Q. 236 (1999) (suggesting that
traditional legal arguments have greater influence on lower court judges than on Supreme Court
justices) and Gillman, supra note 118, at 481-82 (mentioning research that suggests precedents
have greater influence on lower courts than on Supreme Court) with Emerson H. Tiller & Frank
B. Cross, A Modest Proposal For Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 217-18
(1999) (emphasizing that empirical evidence also supports the view that political ideology
strongly influences lower court decision making).
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Supreme Court Nominees - 38 judges should decide cases so as to produce the best consequences,” Dworkin writes, “he does
not specify how judges should decide what the best consequences are.”149
Posner and Dworkin are each driven to describe an adjudicative politics writ large and
simultaneously to denounce the other’s approach because in part they fail to recognize that
adjudication is politics writ small. In fact, while both challenge the law-politics divide
commonly assumed in traditional legal scholarship, they both nonetheless retain remnants of that
persistent dichotomy. Posner, recall, suggests that lower court judges typically are “tethered to
authoritative texts,” unless the law happens to be “uncertain and emotions aroused.” Whereas
Supreme Court decisions are to a great degree “lawless”—the justices vote according to
pragmatic political considerations—lower court judges decide according to the law.150 Posner, it
seems, believes that in the proper circumstances legal interpretation and adjudication can, in
effect, be mechanical and apolitical.151 Dworkin’s retreat to the law-politics dichotomy is less
obvious. First, he banishes pragmatic politics from adjudication. Only his highly stylized
politics of principles is allowed into the realm of law.152 Second, he maintains that concepts can
______________________________
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Posner says little directly about how lower courts decide cases. Yet, his comparisons
between Supreme Court and lower court decision making connotes an unmistakable contrast:
the Supreme Court is political writ large, while the lower courts apply the law. For instance,
Posner writes:
The adjudication of constitutional cases at the Supreme Court level is dominated by cases
in which the conventional sources of legal authority, such as pellucid constitutional text
or binding precedent … do not speak in a clear voice. If they did, the Court would rarely
have to get involved in the matter; it could leave it to the lower courts.
Posner, Foreword, supra note 5, at 42-43.
152

Whereas Dworkin favors the moral politics of a principle-bound community to the
pragmatic politics of a rule-bound community, he does not deny the possibility of pragmatic
politics. Rather, he bars pragmatic politics from adjudication while allowing it in the legislative
arena. In adjudication, Dworkin sharply distinguishes principles from policies. By following
law as integrity, judges should apply principles, but judges should never decide according to
policy considerations. Dworkin’s effort to cabin policy concerns, to separate policies from the
political ideology of principles, further illustrates how he tries to stylize politics to an extreme.
Brian Leiter claims that “after Neil MacCormick’s seminal Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory

Supreme Court Nominees - 39 be understood in a “preinterpretive sense,” which is descriptive rather than normative.153 Thus,
we can discuss a preinterpretive concept of law that is “fairly uncontroversial.”154 Like Posner,
then, Dworkin seems to believe that in certain circumstances we can understand concepts
immediately or directly—that one’s interpretive horizon, in general, and political ideology, more
specifically, do not necessarily come into play and render meanings disputable. Apparently,
Dworkin’s assertion of a preinterpretive sense is in tension with his implicit taxonomic
placement of political-moral principles within the legal process itself.155 Perhaps partly for that
reason, he qualifies the notion of a preinterpretive sense by acknowledging that “some kind of
interpretation is necessary even at [the preinterpretive] stage” of understanding.156 But
simultaneously, he peppers his discussion with phrases suggesting that understanding can
sometimes be prior to interpretation, that understanding can be apolitical, culturally neutral, and
non-normative. He refers, for instance, to the “brute facts of legal history”157 and to the “raw
data” of preinterpretation, as if a judge could directly access historical precedents and doctrinal
rules without interpreting them.158
and John Bell’s Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions, Dworkin quietly abandoned this wildly
implausible claim [distinguishing policies from principles].” Leiter, supra note 130, at 172-73
(citing John Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983); Neil Maccormick, Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978)). Yet, Leiter is clearly wrong on this ground. Both
MacCormick and Bell published well before Dworkin published Law’s Empire in 1986. Yet, in
that book, Dworkin explicitly reaffirmed his earlier distinction between principles and policies.
Dworkin, Empire, supra note 6, at 221-23, 243-44, 438 n.30; see Dworkin, Seriously, supra note
6, at 22 (distinguishing principles and policies).
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Id. at 67. Likewise, Dworkin talks of the “raw behavioral data” of social practices,
including legal practice. Id. at 52. “Dworkin infers, without noticing the inconsistency, that
identifying the preinterpretive features of law must itself be an interpretive endeavor.” Kenneth
Einar Himma, Situating Dworkin: The Logical Space Between Legal Positivism and Natural
Law Theory, 27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 41, 123 (2002); see Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain

Supreme Court Nominees - 40 Ultimately, Posner and Dworkin, each in his own way, both appear to suggest that
interpretation and therefore adjudication can sometimes and in some ways be apolitical. When
the justices become political, then, they must do so self-consciously and aggressively—or so
Posner and Dworkin assume. This assumption leads Posner and Dworkin to dwell on the
adjudicative stance appropriate for a politically assertive Supreme Court justice: a politically
pragmatic adjudication for Posner and a politically principled adjudication for Dworkin. Yet,
contrary to their arguments for adjudicative politics writ large, legal interpretation and
adjudication are always politics writ small. Justices decide cases by interpreting legal texts, and
the understanding of a legal text always arises from within one’s interpretive horizon, which
enables as well as constrains interpretation. Given that a justice’s interpretive horizon always
shapes her understanding of legal texts, political ideology necessarily influences adjudication.
There is no other way to decide cases in accordance with law.
III. Conclusion: Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie?
Returning to the political controversy surrounding the early Roberts Court that introduced
this Essay, what are the implications of an adjudicative politics writ small? Did Roberts and
Alito purposefully lie during their Senate confirmation hearings when they promised to remain
faithful to the rule of law? Have they foregone their promises of fidelity to the Constitution so as
to pursue their conservative political agendas?
While my description of Supreme Court adjudication as politics writ small does not
justify the Roberts Court’s decisions, it does defend the integrity of the justices. Roberts, Alito,
and other Supreme Court nominees and justices sincerely proclaim that they decide cases
according to the rule of law. They faithfully interpret the relevant legal texts, whether
constitutional provisions, judicial precedents, or otherwise. Yet, the justices’ interpretive
conclusions always arise from within their respective political horizons. In most instances, then,
Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, in The Politics of Interpretation 271,
272-78 (W.J. Thomas Mitchell ed., 1983) (criticizing Dworkin for misunderstanding the
structure of the interpretive process).

Supreme Court Nominees - 41 politically conservative justices like Roberts and Alito interpret legal texts in ways that
correspond with their conservative outlooks. While this convenient coincidence between legal
interpretation and politics might easily be attributed to disingenuousness—the justices
determinedly and duplicitiously follow their politics despite their invocations of legal doctrine—
such is not the case. Rather, the correspondence between interpretation and politics arises from
the nature of the interpretive process itself.159 Consequently, liberal justices would act no
differently from Roberts and Alito: they would interpret legal texts in accordance with their
political ideologies (reaching, therefore, liberal conclusions), all the while insisting earnestly and
truthfully that they followed the rule of law.

______________________________
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See generally John Ferejohn, Positive Theory and the Internal View of Law, 10 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 273, 302-03 (2008) (arguing that internal and external views of law are not
necessarily inconsistent); Lori Ringhand, “I’m Sorry, I Can’t Answer That”: Positive
Scholarship and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 331, 357-58
(2008) (arguing that political science scholarship, emphasizing the role of political ideology in
Supreme Court decision making, should help shape the types of questions asked during Senate
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